On guard: A South African soldier in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (John Wessels/AFP)
M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of the eastern DRC’s South Kivu province, on 16 February with little resistance from government forces. Bukavu is a commercial hub of about 1.3 million people, the fall of which is another significant blow to Kinshasa’s authority at home and in the region.
With Rwanda’s support, M23 resumed armed activity in late 2021, after nearly a decade of dormancy after its defeat by a United Nations-backed military operation in November 2013.
This latest offensive, in which M23 made rapid territorial gains, including the seizure of North Kivu’s capital city Goma last month, seems to have caught both the DRC and international community off guard.
The coming weeks will clarify the scale and shape of Rwanda and M23’s ambitions in the region. M23 has already begun filling administrative positions vacated by fleeing civil servants in North Kivu.
Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame may look to install a friendly administration in Kivu to ensure his country’s security and economic interests, and perhaps even seek a form of annexation at a later date.
M23’s ambitions — whether they extend beyond the Kivus and (as publicly stated) aim for regime change in Kinshasa — remain uncertain. However, the risk of further escalation and regionalisation of the conflict is significant, making decisive international action essential.
The March 23 Movement (M23) has its origins in earlier Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebel movements of the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars. Corneille Nangaa, head of M23’s political arm, has cited Tshisekedi’s “corrupt rule”, repression of political opposition and exclusion of the DRC’s Tutsi ethnic minority population as the group’s raison d’etre.
While elements of these grievances may be legitimate, M23’s actions are inextricably tied to Rwanda’s regional geostrategic ambitions. Recent UN estimates suggest M23’s 6 000-strong force in the eastern DRC is supported by 4 000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops.
Conflict in the eastern DRC is commonly viewed as the result of a scramble for minerals. But Rwanda’s support for M23 is shaped by economic, political and national security interests. It is true that the eastern DRC is rich in minerals, including gold, tin, tantalum and others that are increasingly valued in global supply chains, particularly the tech industry. In 2023, Rwanda’s largest export was gold ($885 million; 65% of its total exports), despite producing little locally.
Although it is true that Rwanda can entice Congolese producers to legally and illegally supply gold through lower tariffs and taxes, historically, peaks in Rwandan mineral exports (as a share of total exports) have tended to coincide with Rwandan direct military or proxy occupation in the eastern DRC.
A good way to assess the validity of this claim will be to monitor if Rwanda experiences a significant surge in gold, tin and tantalum exports this year, after the M23 operations.
From a national security perspective, Rwanda views the presence of the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) — opposed to the RDF rule of Rwanda in the eastern DRC — as a direct threat.
Kagame has reiterated how “securing Rwanda’s borders” is critical for the country’s middle-income growth plan ambitions. In a region racked by conflict, Rwanda’s internal stability over the past two decades has been a cornerstone of its economic success. Despite a difficult global economic environment, Rwanda averaged a GDP increase of 8.2% in 2023, with growth across its services (44%), agricultural (27%), and industry (22%) sectors.
But this national economic growth comes at a regional price; proxy groups in the eastern DRC allow Kagame’s government to monitor and suppress any Rwandan opposition movements that might use the region as a base for wider political mobilisation against himself and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
This approach has been used by Kagame in Mozambique, where the RDF’s presence has coincided with targeted assassinations of Rwandan dissidents in hiding. Without democratic reforms that address issues of blocked political participation and abuse of civil liberties, resulting unrest could undermine the
country’s hard-won progress.
Moreover, Rwanda and Uganda, once allies during the First and Second Congo Wars, are now rivals that compete for influence in the eastern DRC. Research by the Congo Research Group, for example, argues that the current resurgence of M23 was triggered by this rivalry — in particular, the November 2021 deployment of Ugandan troops under the joint DRC-Uganda Operation Shujaa against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the announcement of a large road-building project in 2019 designed to boost trade between Uganda and the DRC.
Both developments were viewed by Rwanda as a direct threat to its economic and security ambitions, which jolted it into reactivating M23.
Rwanda has built an image as a stable, business-friendly environment, with strong public sector management, anti-corruption measures and policy consistency. This has helped make the country an attractive investment destination and helped it forge strong international partnerships.
Rwandan troops are also among the most deployed on the continent within multilateral peacekeeping missions and bilateral arrangements, further extending the country’s sphere of influence. This may partly explain the weak response to the current crisis in the DRC.
Last December, after the UN Group of Experts report on the extent of the RDF’s support to M23, no country on the UN Security Council, including the permanent five, called for actions against Kigali. After last month’s escalation in conflict, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and China have directly called for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC, but threats to cut foreign aid support or use targeted sanctions against Rwandan officials have not materialised.
The European Union is similarly struggling to form a unified diplomatic response to pressure Rwanda into ending support for M23. The EU has a range of actions it could take, including reviewing European financial support for the deployment of 4 000 Rwandan security personnel in Mozambique and revaluation of EU foreign aid and supply chain agreements.
Although Belgium, Germany and Sweden are taking a more aggressive stance, other European capitals including Lisbon and Paris seem to prefer a more cautious approach.
Historically, Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries have posed a significant obstacle to Rwanda’s geostrategic ambitions. It was Angolan and Zimbabwean forces that prevented Rwandan and Ugandan troops from taking control of Kinshasa and deposing President Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1998.
The UN Force Intervention Brigade, composed of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian forces, was responsible for halting M23’s 2013 campaign in the eastern DRC and forcing its former leader, Sultani Makenga, to surrender.
Rwanda now seems to be taking advantage of a weakened SADC, which is struggling to coordinate an effective response. After the deaths of 14 South African soldiers at the hands of M23 in January, SADC held an extraordinary summit which “condemned in the strongest terms the attack on SAMIDRC [the Southern African Development Community mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo] troops by M23”. But there was no mention of the material and operational support provided to those troops by Rwanda or condemnation of Kigali’s actions.
From July 2021 to July 2023, both SADC and RDF troops were deployed to the same region of Mozambique under separate agreements (Rwandan forces remain present). The RDF probably had a close view of SADC forces’ weaknesses and used these insights against them in North Kivu.
On 8 February, SADC and the East African Community held a joint summit on the security situation in the eastern DRC. The joint summit called for the resumption of direct negotiations with all parties, including M23 — something Tshisekedi has been opposed to — and the merging of the Luanda/Nairobi peace process, both of which favour Rwanda.
The balance of power seems to heavily favour Rwanda, with Kagame maintaining his typically defiant stance against pressure to alter course. But his position may shift if Rwanda’s international partners implement measures that significantly affect the cost-benefit dynamics of his actions in the DRC.
Stephen Buchanan-Clarke is the head of Good Governance Africa’s Peace and Security Programme.
