A Somaliland police officer gives directions to voters in front of a tent operating as a polling station during the 2024 Somaliland presidential election in Hargeisa on November 13, 2024. (Photo by LUIS TATO/AFP via Getty Images)
“I would hate to see the Red Sea bottled up on both ends by people who might not necessarily be or remain our friends.”
This statement was made by former US president Dwight Eisenhower in 1959, three years before Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia abrogated a federal treaty and amalgamated Eritrea with Ethiopia.
Eisenhower’s statement seemed to be a preemptive endorsement of Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea because of the latter’s value at the time in the US’s global strategy. The president also appreciated Ethiopia’s role in the Korean War.
Incoming US president Donald Trump’s rationale for recognising Somaliland, if he does, would not be vastly different from the one Eisenhower, in effect, used for Eritrea. China might also be tempted to use the same logic in the Horn of Africa.
Should Trump recognise Somaliland, as has been reported in the US and United Kingdom, it would be because, among other things, he wanted a military base in one of the best natural harbours Africa has, the port of Berbera.
Trump is not alone in seeking to recognise Somaliland. US congressman Scott Perry introduced a Bill last month calling for recognition of the territory. If the US recognises Somaliland, other countries will probably follow suit.
China has a military base in neighbouring Djibouti.
Apart from adding an extra layer of complexity to the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, Trump’s recognition of Somaliland would fuel Sino-American rivalry in that region.
Colonial roots
In 1991, the Somali Republic (Somalia), which was created in 1960, split into Somaliland (a former British colony) and Somalia (a former Italian colony). Somalia does not recognise the secession of Somaliland.
Also in 1991, Eritrea, which was created and so named by Italy in 1890, seceded from Ethiopia.
Somaliland seceded from a union with greater Somalia, to which it had originally consented, but Eritrea seceded from a union with Ethiopia that had been imposed upon it. In the case of the Somali Republic, the union of the former British and former Italian territories was an attempt to reject European colonial boundaries.
In the case of Eritrea, its annexation into Ethiopia was an attempt to substitute European colonial boundaries with indigenous imperial control. Given this, what would Trump’s recognition of Somaliland mean for the key stakeholders?
US and Somaliland
Since 2002, the US has operated Camp Lemonnier, a naval base in what was French Somaliland; Djibouti, as it is known today, is a tiny country sandwiched between Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia. This means the US will get a strategic prize (vis-à-vis China) in return, should Trump recognise Somaliland.
It would also mean that, if all goes well, Somaliland could be on the verge of regaining statehood. For more than two decades, the Republic of Somaliland has maintained relative peace (unlike its conflict-ridden neighbour Somalia), has formed governments and has held periodic democratic elections.
In most places in Africa, less than a decade after independence, the basic principles of democracy have been ignored. Unfortunately for Somaliland, the international community has been reluctant to recognise it as a legitimate state.
States need international recognition just as humans need oxygen to survive. That Somaliland has not only survived without international recognition for more than 30 years, but thrived in the international system, is fascinating.
One more thing that makes the experience of Somaliland perplexing has to do with the neighbourhood in which it strove to consolidate its democratic institutions. According to the rating by Freedom House (2024), Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia score lower (meaning they are less democratic) than Somaliland.
China, Eritrea and Taiwan
Should Trump recognise Somaliland, China might seek to counter by looking for an alternative option for a military or naval base in another relatively new Red Sea-bordering state. Eritrea is an ideal candidate.
China-Eritrea relations are already cordial. In fact, Eritrea’s leader, Isaias Afwerki, received military training in China in the early 1960s at the start of Eritrea’s 30-year war of liberation with Ethiopia.
If China gets a military or naval base in Eritrea, in response to the US’s base in Somaliland, it would in some ways be reminiscent of the time from 1952 to 1974 when the US, at the height of the Cold War, operated defence installations in Eritrea.
In 1952, Eritrea had federal status in Ethiopia but the territory was “re-unified” with Ethiopia in 1962 — with tacit US support. In other words, should China decide to pursue an alternative base in Eritrea, the logic used by the US vis-à-vis Eritrea could retain some validity for China, too.
The US abandoned its military communications base in Eritrea when it became less useful because of the advent of satellite technology.
Although Somaliland already has excellent relations with Taiwan, extra complications could arise for China’s diplomacy in the Horn of Africa regarding Taiwan if Trump should recognise Somaliland. This is a result of the possibility that the recognition will prompt the newest state in the Horn of Africa to upgrade and formalise its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.
Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister, Francois Wu, visited Somaliland on 12 December. The newly formalised ties between independent Somaliland and Ethiopia could, in turn, elevate the profile of the bilateral relations between Somaliland and Taiwan, at least in Africa. This fear perhaps explains China’s strong opposition to any such diplomatic manoeuvres by both Taiwan and Somaliland.
As Mai Ning, the spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, put it last month: “China firmly opposes mutual establishment of official institutions or any form of official exchanges between Taiwan authorities and Somaliland.”
Ethiopia and Somalia
Should Trump recognise Somaliland, it would be a win for Ethiopia because it, too, could quickly follow suit and gain access to the sea through the port of Berbera. Over the past 30 years, Ethiopia’s leaders have aimed to achieve that in return for diplomatic recognition of Somaliland but could not do so for fear of backlash, particularly from the African Union and the United Nations.
The recently signed memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland was also designed to set the stage for this goal. Ethiopia and Somalia are at loggerheads over this memorandum.
But China-Ethiopia relations are strong enough to withstand Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland.
UAE, Turkey and Egypt
The United Arab Emirates will be on the winning side, should Trump recognise Somaliland. It is already supportive of Somaliland’s independence and its recognition by other countries.
Turkey would incur diplomatic cost, as would Egypt, to a larger extent. The bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Turkey will be tested, if Ethiopia recognises Somaliland. Indeed, Turkey has been engaged in an exercise of what could be called diplomatic miscegenation in the region. In December, it brought together the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia, in Ankara, with a view to helping them resolve their differences. It favours the unity of Somalia and Somaliland and sees itself as a friend of both countries.
Egypt’s historical machinations to undermine Ethiopia are well known. But they have intensified in recent times as the country seeks to leverage closeness to pressure Ethiopia over the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Egypt had initially attempted to do this through Sudan, which has descended into a seemingly endless civil war. Its diplomatic infatuation with Somalia in the last few months is a direct consequence of this broad strategy.
There is an element of irony in Egypt’s misfortune, should Trump recognise Somaliland, because it was Trump himself who openly suggested in October 2020, during his first term as president, that Egypt might blow up the dam.
In the final analysis, Somaliland must be seen in the broader context of the contiguities of geography and the continuities of history that have shaped and re-shaped the alignment of forces among the unequal regional players in the Horn of Africa.
Should Trump recognise Somaliland, it will also be a catalyst for great power competition in the region. After all, Somaliland has enormous strategic value, including proximity to the world’s major shipping routes and oil reserves.
Dr Seifudein Adem is a research fellow at JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development in Tokyo, Japan.
